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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the conflicts which are resulted from coal tax reform in 
China from economic and public policy perspectives. An analytical framework involving actors, 
values, interests and institution has been applied. China’s central government eagers to achieve 
fiscal revenue increase, environmental protection and energy conversation goals by a good 
governance of coal system. As a traditional and feasible policy instrument, taxation is regarded 
for dealing with energy issues in politics and governance. However, coal tax reform proposal 
has induced many controversies in China. The causes of that include value conflicts of all actors, 
competing interests of all parties and institutional barriers of economic, politics and legislation. 
Therefore, the government cannot regulate coal issues only through taxation. The case reveals 
that good governance on coal cannot be achieved only by economic tools as the coal system 
contains so high stake and involves so many players.  
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1 Introduction 
Energy has led to several problems including environmental, secure and social 
challenges. Since the Industrial Revolution, economic boom has been continuously 
inducing an increase in energy use while energy has fed the industrialization. That is, 
economic growth and energy use are driven by each other (Stern, 2011). Nowadays, 
energy has been a vital variable of good governance which can be defined as 
“effectiveness and efficiency, the rule of law, participation, transparency, and social 
co-ordination” (Meadowcroft, 2007). Thus, authorities need to regulate energy issues to 
achieve sustainability, development and equity
1
, using governance instruments. 
Taxation is the oldest tool used by governments (Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Since it 
was introduced into resource management (Nanley, et al., 2007), governments have 
regulated energy issues through taxation, for adjusting the cost gap and dealing with the 
externalities in terms of public goods and market failure (Goldthau, 2011). However, 
policy instruments are used by policymakers to achieve their purpose not only just for 
economic optimization, but for sustainable development
2
, benefit equity and social 
justice. Consequently, we may ask: can government attain these public objectives 
through tax instruments without conflicts? If conflict happens, what is the underlying 
cause? Is there better approach for resolving these conflicts?  
This study will answer these questions based on a China’s case. The purpose of this case 
study is to examine the types of energy conflicts resulting from a current tax tool 
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 It includes intragenerational equity and intergenerational equity (Brundtland, 1987).  
2 Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland, 1987). 
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implement, and to investigate the reasons for these conflicts. Four dimensions are 
analysed: actors, values, interests and institutional barriers.  
2 Case selection 
China’s resource tax system, which is established in 1984 and revised in 1994, involves 
coal, oil, natural gas and other mineral products. Currently, China's resource tax is 
determined by the quantity exploited rather than the market value, and the tax revenue is 
owned by provincial government in production province rather than central government 
(Liu, 2008). Nowadays, China attempts to launch a nationwide resource tax reform after 
testing on oil and gas in Xinjiang provinces from 2010 (Shan & Weng, 2010). However, 
the centre of controversy is about coal.   
Coal, as it were, is the blood of China’s industrialization and modernization. China’s 
development depends upon coal. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) report (2012), coal accounts for around 70% in China’s total energy consumption 
and more than 60% electricity generation (See Figures 1&2). Additionally, China’s 
Energy White Paper (2007) states that China’s energy structure ‘with coal playing the 
main role will remain unchanged for a long time to come.’ Thus, coal is a vital sector for 
China’s energy security and growth stability. 
Correspondingly, China at present confronts many challenges on coal regulation. Coal 
has been, up to now, the main cause of smoke pollution as well as the main source of 
carbon emissions in China; China’s economy is sensitive to coal market fluctuation; 
coal industry development does not benefit all parties in the society. These reflect that 
4 
the social cost of coal is not equal to its social benefit. Hence, the central government 
deems that the coal price mechanism is a crucial factor for rebalancing and sustaining 
development in the coal industry and national economy, while the key is coal tax 
reform.  
Figure 1                               Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, viewed 7 October 2012, 
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH>. 
Reform proposal indicates that setting 3%-5% tax rate based on coal price replaces 
current quantity-based tax
3
 (Xie, 2012), for increasing government revenue, curbing 
excessive production, saving resources and protecting environment, but without 
changing the proprietorship of resource tax revenue. However, the actors holding 
different values and interests would lead to conflict. 
3 Actors 
The actors involved in this case can be observed from three angles: market, local 
government and central government. They are listed in table 1. 
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 According to China Energy Newswire (2010), in many provinces, the coal tax amounts to about RMB 8 ($1.27) per 
ton, but the coal price reported by China Qingdao coal market ranges from RMB 450 to RMB 700 per ton. 
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Table 1   The Actors and their positions 
Angles Actors Position 
Central 
government 
National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC)  
A main macroeconomic management administration of China, 
regulating the overall price level, output, employment, resource 
conservation and climate change. It also takes responsibility for 
making coal policy. 
State Administration of Taxation(SAT) 
It charges the tax affairs in all country including setting tax rate and 
making specific regulations. 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council(SASAC) 
It is the major stockholder of all the state-owned coal companies. 
Local 
government 
Coal-production provinces 
They are the main objectives whom central government want to help 
them develop using coal tax. 
Coal-consumption provinces 
They are developed regions with larger population and more GDP but 
without coal reserve. And they have more policy impact on central 
government. 
Market 
Coal companies 
They lie in the upstream of the production chain and nearly a 
competitive market. 
Electricity companies They are the main consumer of coal and all are state-owned. 
Residents  
They are in the downstream of the production chain and mainly use 
electricity for life. 
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4 Analysis 
The case is analysed in three dimensions: Values conflicts, competing interests and 
institutional barriers. 
4.1 Value conflicts 
Different actors harbour different values. The value conflicts are observed in this study 
by three categories: supply side, demand side and governments. 
4.1.1 Supply side 
◆ Coal companies: Traditionally, China’s coal industry has been fragmented by large 
state-owned companies, local state-owned companies and a large quantity of town 
and village coal companies (EIA, 2012). But pursuing profit is their common value 
as a business. Moreover, they firmly believe that government should alleviate the 
mass tax burdens and promote the market efficiency instead of doing the opposite 
(Wang, 2010). Thus, they would be against the tax reform. 
4.1.2 Demand side 
◆ Electricity companies: In China, electricity industry is tightly connected with coal. 
As a main raw material of electricity generation, coal price increase will exacerbate 
the cost of electricity companies. Nonetheless, they cannot increase electricity price 
as a response because the price is controlled by government
4
 (Austin, 2005). 
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 China’s electricity regulation regime involves two state-owned grid enterprises, five national generation groups, 
four assistant groups and one regulator. Electricity is seen as a kind of necessity for all the people so the price is 
inflexible. But coal market is almost a competitive market. 
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Electricity sector treats the reform as discrimination unless central government frees 
electricity price. Consequently, they will opposite the reform too. 
◆ Residents: Many people support the reform in their value, because for a long time, 
the resource rate is too low to manifest the scarcity of coal. Consequently, coal 
mines can gain supernormal profit so easy that they neglect to protect the resources 
and environment. It is against the principle of social and ecological justice. 
4.1.3 Governments 
 Central government: It insists on the reform concerning about fiscal revenue, 
energy security, environment and potential over production risk in coal industry. 
◆ Coal-production provinces: Eight provinces listed in table 2 contribute more than 
80% coal production (Qu, 2011).  
Table 2 China’s main coal production provinces 
provinces location development Autonomous or not 
Shanxi centre undeveloped NO 
Inner Mongolia west undeveloped YES 
Shaanxi west undeveloped NO 
Xinjiang west undeveloped YES 
Ningxia west undeveloped YES 
Guizhou west undeveloped NO 
These provinces are energy-driven meaning that GDP and fiscal revenue are mainly 
from the resource tax. Coal is seen as the most precious gift. Someone thinks the 
revenue, under current resource tax regime, is over underrated (Chen, 2012). 
Moreover, autonomous regions believe that, they should not only own coal tax 
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revenue, but also should enjoy the right of setting resource tax rate in their region 
based on the principle of Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (Wang, 2011). Despite that, 
they are in favour of the reform. 
◆ Coal-consumption provinces: They are complaining about who should own the tax 
revenue. Previously, it seems reasonable that the quantity-based revenue belongs to 
the original production provinces as the output is produced in that region. However, 
the logic of price-based revenue allocation is vague. Good price based on the market 
is created by all the people, in other words, the revenue should be shared by all the 
participants not just by who produce it. It is something about rationality (Zhang & 
Pan, 2007).  
To sum up, all the actors and their values can be seen in table 2. 
Table3   Actors and Values 
Actors Value Attitude 
Supply side Coal company efficiency opposite 
Demand side 
Electricity sector equity opposite 
residents justice support 
Regulation 
bodies 
Central government optimal support 
Local gov. 
Coal-production fairness support 
Coal-consumption rationality opposite 
4.2 Competing interests  
Any reform involves interest conflicts. So how to governance different interests of 
stakeholders is China’s biggest challenge. The interest conflicts could be investigated 
from three horizontal dimensions. The first one is conflicts among coal mines, 
electricity companies and terminal residents; the second conflict lies within local 
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provinces; the last one exists in different departments of central government. See 
Figure3. 
LEVEL 1: MARKET LEVEL
LEVEL 2: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LEVEL 3: CETRAL GOVERNMENT
COAL-PRODUCTION
PROVINCES
COAL-CONSUMPTION
PROVINCES
RESIDENTS ELECTRICITY COAL COMPANY
NDRC
SAT SASAC
SUPPORT OPPOSITE CONDITIONAL SUPPORT
FIGURE 3 ANALYSIS ON INTEREST CONFLICTS
 
4.2.1 Level I: Coal company vs. electricity sector vs. residents 
Higher coal tax rate will result in the coal price increase, yet as a main coal consumer, 
electricity generations cannot enhance electricity price, which is supervised by 
government. The benefit shrinking in electricity sector would trigger the conflicts 
between these two sectors on price negotiation. 
On the other hand, although residents support this reform, they cannot accept a high 
living cost. As the terminal energy consumer, they will fight with electricity companies 
if latter wants to increase the price. 
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Thus, interest conflicts among coal mines, electricity companies and residents will lead 
to market fluctuations. Electricity companies tend to be against the reform accompany 
with coal mines; while for terminal residents, they would support the reform only if 
electricity price was fixed or they can get enough subsidies to hedge against the increase 
in living cost. 
4.2.2 Level II: coal-production provinces vs. coal-consumption provinces 
Coal-production provinces are commonly coal-driven economies which are sensitive to 
energy price. A flourishing coal industry will lead to GDP growth, lower unemployment 
rate and larger tax revenue, so they will benefit more if coal price increases (Shan & 
Weng, 2010). Meanwhile, these governments shoulder responsibilities for protecting 
resources and environment in their region. Under the existing resource revenue 
allocation arrangement, these local governments can collect more revenue from new tax 
system and impose mines in their region to be more eco-friendly.  
Nevertheless, the other coal-consumption provinces, which are a manufacture-driven 
economy, will be seriously influenced by new tax system. If coal price goes high, many 
factories will slump. They will confront higher unemployment, lower output and fiscal 
revenue. Consequently, new tax regime will hurt their development.  
4.2.3 Level III: conflicts in central government 
Nowadays, there is no special energy administration in China’s cabinet. Since the 
ministry of coal industry has been rescinded in 1998, the power of coal regulation is 
sharing by several divisions.  
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◆ National Development and Reform Commission(NDRC)  
For energy conservation and emission reduction, NDRC should support the new tax 
regime; however, it could contradict the responsibility of regulating inflation (NDRC, 
2003). If the new tax is launched in booming session, it would lead to cost push 
inflation; otherwise, it could lead to deflation in depression session. Considering the 
political interest of itself, it looks a dilemma for NDRC. 
◆ State Administration of Taxation (SAT) 
Increasing government revenue is always its interest, especially, when it facing to many 
complains from western resourceful provinces about their fiscal problems. Thus, SAT is 
a supporter from its standpoint.  
◆ State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council(SASAC) (SASAC, 2003) 
By contract, SASAC will be a opponent of SAT because it ‘performs investor’s 
responsibilities, manages the state-owned assets and enhances the value of the 
state-owned assets’ (SASAC, 2003). That is to say, anything could harm the interest of 
state-owned companies is against the interest of SASAC. 
In 2010, state-owned companies take the highest percentage of total coal production 
(see Figure 4).  
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Source: State Administration of Work Safety 
Put differently, the new resource tax will hurt 65% state-owned coal companies 
inevitably. As the strong coal lobby in central government, SASAC will fight for the 
interest of coal industry and argue with SAT and NDRC. 
4.3 Institutional barriers 
Some institutional barriers could be responsible for this conflict. Overall, they can be 
investigated through economic, political and legislation dimensions. See figure 5. 
4.3.1 Economic 
The unreasonable pricing mechanism of the energy market has existed for a long time. 
The upstream industry, coal, enjoys more marketization than the downstream electricity. 
The coal price is formulated by the market but the electricity price is controlled by the 
government. The electricity price cannot fluctuate with the coal price simultaneously. 
The pricing system does not reflect the interest of every part in the industry chain and 
large state-
owned 
50% 
local state-
owned 
15% 
town and village  
35% 
Figure 4  The distribution of coal supply in 2010, by ownership 
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the scarcity of energy. This controversy is the kernel in the economics review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Political 
Government structure lies in the heart of politics. In the central government, the power 
of coal supervision is divided into different sectors which have different standpoints. 
Among local governments, the absent channel for harmonizing interests and values is 
the key reason. China’s parliament members are elected according to the proportion of 
population, there is no a political mechanism, which can represent each province 
equally by the same number of representatives. That is why the local appeals, especially 
for those with smaller population in west, always are ignored in the parliament
5
.  
4.3.3 Legislation 
There are also ambiguous areas in the law. For instance, the rights of autonomous 
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 China’s parliament is Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. 
Politics:
Government organization 
structure
Legislation:
Rights and obligations of 
every actors
Economic:
Energy pricing mechanism
Figure 5 Overview of institutional barries
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regions are not clear and sometimes conflict with other regulations; the power of 
taxation and the right of deriving tax revenue have not been defined appropriately. 
Overall, many conflicts happen in the vacancy of law. 
5 Assessment and possible options 
Based on the analysis above, the competing interest is the most significant governance 
challenge which is China’s government facing. Tax reform per se is about benefit 
reallocation and transfer. Thus, China could need to do some preparations before 
starting the resource tax reform.  
Firstly, a successful resource tax reform should be under the condition that the energy 
market and pricing reform have been finished. Only eliminate the monopoly and control 
in electricity market, can coal tax reform go on wheels. Correspondingly, some 
increased revenue from new tax regime should be transferred to residents as a subsidy 
for a possible increase in energy price.  
Secondly, the central government should establish the ministry of energy for integrating 
the energy regulation powers and avoiding conflicts by itself. 
Thirdly, the government can use some incentive tools (Schneider & Ingram, 1990) to 
encourage coal companies to save energy not only by taxation.  
Alternatively, the government could utilize various practice of resource taxation 
(Garnaut, 2010), such as the progressive profits tax(PPT) to ease coal companies’ tax 
burden whereas improving its financial account. 
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6 Conclusion  
China’s experience on resource tax reform reveals that there is no win-win result can be 
achieved. Probably because the coal system with so high stakes, which involves many 
stakeholders with distinct values, is too complex to be taken full account of the 
acceptability of all parties among various interest groups. Put differently, government 
cannot advance a change without conflicts only by taxation instrument. Tax tools have 
some instinctive limitations as a kind of authority methods. Instead, other policy tool 
combinations could be considered for multi-goals achievement.  
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